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Can Jobs Programs Build Peace?
Tilman Brück, Neil T. N. Ferguson, Valeria Izzi, and Wolfgang Stojetz
In the last decade, well over $10 billion has been spent on employment programs designed
to contribute to peace and stability. Despite the outlay, whether these programs perform,
and how they do so, remain open questions. This study conducts three reviews to derive the
status quo of knowledge. First, it draws on academic literature on the microfoundations of
instability to distill testable theories of how employment programs could affect stability at
the micro level. Second, it analyses academic and grey literature that directly evaluates the
impacts of employment programs on peace-related outcomes. Third, it conducts a system-
atic review of program-based learning from over 400 interventions. This study finds good
theoretical reasons to believe that employment programs could contribute to peace. However,
only very limited evidence exists on overall impacts on peace or on the pathways underlying
the theories of change. At the program level, the review finds strong evidence that contri-
butions to peace and stability are often simply assumed to have occurred. This provides a
major challenge for the justification of continued spending on jobs for peace programs. In-
stead, systematic and rigorous learning on the impacts of jobs for peace programs needs to
be scaled up urgently.
JEL Codes: H56, H84, I25, I38, O12
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Introduction
It is logical, if sometimes hopeful, that an employment program should boost the la-
bor market performance of its participants (Adoho et al. 2014; Cho and Honoratie
2014; Attanasio et al. 2015), even if much remains to be learned (Blattman and
Ralston 2015). Similarly, well-designed peacebuilding interventions might, reason-
ably, be expected to contribute to peace and promote stability (Fearon et al. 2008;
Ackett 2011; Gaarder and Annan 2013; Gilligan et al. 2013; Blattman et al. 2017).
Linking these two concepts are a series of programs that aim to build peace and
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stability by stimulating employment. Since 2005,well over $10billionhas been spent
by international donors on this class of intervention.1 This article testswhat is known
about the rationale and performance of these programs. Do employment programs
really contribute to peacebuilding? And if so, how?
To answer these questions, this study produces the first comprehensive overview
of theory and evidence on the linkages between employment programs and peace
and social stability, built on three related reviews. First, it analyzes the academic lit-
erature on micro-level drivers of violent and other antisocial behaviors that could,
potentially, be influenced by employment. The resulting insights are then applied to
specify testable theories of change. Second, the study undertakes a critical evalua-
tion of the academic and grey literatures in order to establish the empirical evidence
for linkages between employment programs and indicators and behaviors related to
peacebuilding and social stability promotion. Finally, a deep review of agency doc-
umentation assesses how the impacts of employment programs on stability-related
outcomes have been theorized and tested in practice.
The study identifies four key theories of change, which we label “Opportunity”,
“Grievance”, “Contact” and “Competition”. These theories posit that employment
programs can mitigate the risk of violence through the following actions: increasing
the opportunity costs of engaging in illegal activities (Becker 1968); reducing (per-
ceived) inequalities and unfairness, especially between groups (Collier and Hoeffler
2004); stimulating positive inter-group interactions (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006); or
reducing (perceptions of) competition for scarce economic resources (Abbink et al.
2010). At the same time, empirical studies on the important links in these causal
chains often lack consistency in the impacts they find, or are missing entirely.
A systematic review methodology identifies over 400 programs conducted by in-
ternational organizations. The analysis assesses how peace and stability are concep-
tualized at the level of individual interventions, the aspects of these concepts that
programs aim to target, and the success of the program in doing so. The review finds
no evidence that any of these programs have critically examined the links between
the intervention and the aspects of instability it targets, either as an input to pro-
gram design or in a rigorous impact evaluation. Rather, it finds strong evidence that
contributions to peace and stability are simply assumed to have occurred.
Therefore, while there are satisfactory theoretical grounds to believe that employ-
ment programs can contribute to peace and stability, the observed impacts are far
from a foregone conclusion. A lack of both case study evidence and program-level
learning suggests a more nuanced pictured than is assumed in programming deci-
sions. Furthermore, empirical gaps in key theories suggest an urgent requirement for
more rigorous studies, better program design and learning, and more conservative
expectations of what some employment programs can achieve. That said, available
evidence does not suggest that employment programs do not build peace; nor should
the conclusions be interpreted as suggesting that the key relationships do not exist.
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Rather, they show a lack of critical reflection and a lack of rigorous evidence present
in research, practice and implementation.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section2 conducts an applied
literature review in order to establishwhy employment programsmight contribute to
peace and promote stability; section 3 reviews case study evidence from the academic
andgrey literatures; section4presents a systematic reviewof program-level learning.
Section 5 concludes, reflects and gives recommendations.
What Drives Antisocial Behavior and Why Might Employment
Programs Interrupt It?
Following Galtung (1969), peace is differentiated into “positive peace” (the absence
of violence and the unfolding of conflict in a constructive way) and “negative peace”
(merely the absence of direct violence). This article is interested in positive peace
and, consequently, in the range of behaviors—violent and non-violent—that erode
positive peace, which this article characterizes as “antisocial”. Based on economic
first principles, this section defines individual motivations to engage in antisocial
behaviors and how these motives might change as a consequence of employment
programs.2
Such a micro-level lens is of particular interest because most employment pro-
grams take place at the individual level, while threats to social stability also have
well-established microfoundations (Justino et al. 2013; Verwimp et al. 2019). These
foundations not only relate to participation in organized violence but spans implicit
support for militant organizations (Kalyvas 2006) and other deliberately disruptive
activities. In turn, it is important to consider how employment might interrupt and
deter such behaviors. While this approach emphasizes the supply side of antisocial
behavior, the demand side is also relevant. For example, programsmight create alter-
native sources of demand for “idle hands”.3
This study derives four key theories that have been offered as explanations for anti-
social behavior and that, conceivably, are influenced by individual economic circum-
stances: opportunity costs of illegal activities (Becker 1968); greed and grievance
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004); contact theory (Allport 1954); and competition be-
tween groups (Fehr et al. 2013). Each theory is discussed in the subsections below.
The Grievance Theory
The “grievances” that people hold, and how they are formed, are key drivers of so-
cial fracture (Gergen 1995). These grievances could be focused on any of a range of
well-defined targets but generally stem fromunfairness—real or imagined—between
groups. This section discusses two main routes through which the existence of
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grievances can be linked to antisocial behaviors: low trust between the populace
and the government (vertical); and tensions between socio-demographic groups
(horizontal).
First, attitudes towards governments and other elites are a key predictor of antiso-
cial behaviors. Based on data collected from peasants in El Salvador,Wood (2003) de-
fines a “non-material” theory of insurgency. Amongst other key factors, local condi-
tions before the conflict and perceptions of the government come to the fore in choices
to offer active support to rebels, despite high risks and a lack of private gains from do-
ing so. This adheres closely to more general “hearts and minds” theories. For exam-
ple, on observing that violence against civilians increased insurgent violence, Kalyvas
(2006) theorizes that those victimizedwill be less likely to offer support or information
to government forces, thereby increasing rebels’ capacity to attack. Rebel violence
against civilians, similarly, predicts reduced violence by that group in subsequent
periods (Condra and Shapiro 2011). Mercy Corps (2013) suggests that perceptions
of government corruption among Afghan youths is a strong predictor of sympathy
towards armed opposition groups.
Thus, the poor provision of services, (real or perceived) corruption, violent
crackdowns and other government failings increase incentives for individuals to
participate—non-violently and violently—in rebellion. If jobs programs can increase
support for the government, they have a role to play in peace and stability. For ex-
ample, programs that prominently feature the government are likely to have similar
impacts on winning hearts and minds as service provision, which should reduce in-
centives to support insurgent groups. Dasgupta et al. (2017) show a long-run reduc-
tion in Maoist violence in India, due to a rural employment guarantee program, as
does Fetzer (2014). Berman et al. (2011) confirm that improved government service
provision is causally linked to reductions in insurgent violence in Iraq.
Such findings, however, derive from large-scale government programs that are tar-
geted regionally. Programsof this scale and complexity are not always available, prac-
tical, or even possible.Whether programs that target a limited number of participants
can replicate the impact of large-scale transfers remains an open question. Here, a
“unit of analysis” problem exists (Blattman andRalston 2015). In otherwords, given
that the reasons why individuals select into violence are often unclear, it is also un-
clear which programs are well-placed to reduce violence.
Second, perceptions of poverty and/or inequality have long been associated with
violence and other antisocial behaviors (Gurr 1970; Sen 1973). Such inequalities
exist—or are perceived to exist—in several dimensions (such as opportunity, power,
income, or health) and can be captured between social strata (“vertical inequal-
ity”) or between groups (“horizontal inequality”; Murshed 2015; Stewart 2000).
While such inequalities do not feature prominently in macro-level studies (Fearon
and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004), it is argued to directly influence antiso-
cial behavior at the micro level (Østby 2013). Both vertical (Bircan et al. 2017) and
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horizontal (Stewart 2008; Roemer 1998; Tilly 1998) inequalities are associatedwith
group-based conflict and its onset (Buhaug et al. 2014).While inequalities in income
or wealth in a country may not stimulate antisocial behavior, those between recog-
nizable groups could be a major threat.4
The role that employment programming can play in reducing inequalities is intu-
itive. Any efforts to increase incomes or access to economic opportunities should re-
duce such perceptions of unfairness. Careful cross-group rollout of programs could
mitigate between-group tensions. However, such logic also implies serious risks—
programs that are, or are perceived to be, exclusive (Karell and Schutte 2018), prone
to elite capture, or are otherwise perceived to be unfairly rolled out, could all stimulate
violence.
Optimal policies to mitigate inequalities are debated (Stewart 2005; Stewart et al.
2008; Immervoll and Richardson 2011; Ravallion 2001; Coady and Gupta 2012),
as are their performance (Martin 1999). Forster et al. (2011) and Leibbrandt et al.
(2010) argue a critical role for employment policies in reducing inequality, although
they focus mostly on labor market reform, rather than on individual jobs. Banerjee
and Duflo (2007, 2008) and Reardon et al. (2000) show positive impacts of income
diversification on mitigating inequalities. Such diversification could be stimulated by
employment programs but empirical evidence confirmation it scant and hints that
long causal chains are at play.
The Opportunity Theory
While grievance is universal, opportunity is not (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). A long
line of economic literature argues that grievance, alone, does not drive violence.
Rather, engagement in crime, rebellion, or any other illegal activity can be thought
of as a utility maximization problem (Becker 1968). Individuals weigh the relative
costs and benefits of engaging in a particular act and behave rationally based on this
calculus. These ideas have been applied to a range of crimes (see Draca and Machin
2015) and to various forms of political violence (Hirschleifer 1995; Collier and
Hoeffler 1998). Thus, what deters engagement in antisocial behaviors is not a lack
of motive, but the fact that such behaviors do not maximize utility. In turn, anything
that increases the costs of rebellion, or reduces the benefits of it, will deter individuals
from choosing that course of action.
Thought of in terms of a materially self-interested economic agent, this suggests
two major roles played by employment. If one starts from a high-income base, the
space into which future income can move (or is expected to move) as a consequence
of victory will be lower, thus reducing the benefits of rebellion. At the same time,
a higher income level implies greater income from the legal labor market forgone.
Thus, for a given vector of inputs (e.g., set risks of death and injury, a set probability
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of victory, and a set of associated outcomes post-conflict), increases in income should
reduce willingness to engage in antisocial behaviors.
These theories, however, build explicitly on a macrofoundation that is not, imme-
diately, tractable at the individual level. For example, those who have demonstrably
engaged in rebellion are not themost disadvantaged in their societies (BuenoKrueger
andMalečková 2003; de Mesquita 2005). In turn, while a narrative has formed that
employment is synonymous with peace, the underlying logic remains unquestioned
and untested (Cramer 2010; International Alert 2014a; 2014b) at themicro-level at
which most programs take place. In turn, it is not immediately clear that changes to
employment at the individual level should be expected to influence those same indi-
viduals’ decisions to take part in antisocial behavior.
A more direct implication of the opportunity theory states that poverty, itself, is
distressing, and that associated frustrations can manifest as violence (Blattman and
Miguel 2010). Related to this is “idleness” (Huntington 1996; Goldstone 2001),
which espouses that individuals with nothing to do (especially youth—see Urdal
2004) are a conflict risk. Keeping frustrated individuals occupied (the “incapacitation
effect”—see Jacob and Lefgren 2003) should minimize conflict risk. In the developed
world, such strategies have been shown tomitigate behaviors suchas skipping school,
and low-level criminal behaviors (Jacob and Lefgren 2003; Luallen 2006; Anderson
2014). Yet, evidence of such outcomes in developing countries, or in the context of
organized political violence, is extremelyweak (MercyCorps 2015). In turn,while the
links between job programs and opportunity is clear, the links between opportunity
and violence—at least at the individual level—are not fully established.
Contact Theory
The formation of groups, and of group identities, is commonly defined as a key so-
cial issue in conflict (Beekman et al. 2014; Bauer et al. 2018). The presence of in-
group bias is not surprising.Whether in the form of “minimal” groups created in the
lab (Brewer and Silver 1978) or “real” groups (Ostrom and Sedikides 1992), indi-
viduals bias towards their own group and discriminate against others – the so-called
“parochial social norms” theory (Fehr et al. 2013). Willingness to punish “norm vi-
olators”, too, is delineated along group lines (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004). Extreme
group-biases link to the onset of conflict (Halevy et al. 2008; Struch and Schwartz
1989). Long-term systematic evidence (see Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) shows that
bringing individuals from different groups together can reduce these biases and help
to alleviate social tensions. It follows that programs that bring individuals of different
ethnicities together might mitigate conflict.
In complex environments, however, findings from such programs are not clear cut.
Rydgren et al. (2013) find strong evidence of improvements in inter-group contact in
shared environments in Iraq. Those who use shared spaces are more likely to develop
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friendships that cross group boundaries and are more likely to express trust and tol-
erance towards out-groups. Hjørt (2014) on the other hand, shows that individuals
accept lower total pay and output in order to bias against out-groups in a flower fac-
tory in Kenya. Cilliers et al. (2016) show positive inter-group perspectives from con-
tact workshops, but this comes at the cost of reduced personal well-being. Okunogbe
(2016) studies a program that relocates university graduates across Nigeria. Those
who are assigned to districts in which their tribal ethnicity is not in a majority show
greater national pride and higher levels of knowledge about other ethnicities.
Similar analogies can be drawn to “community-driven development” (CDD) pro-
gramming, which is built on the idea that social cohesion emerges from individu-
als collaborating under the given institutional arrangements. However, when con-
sidered in terms of altering individual relationships, such programs have struggled to
produce an impact (King, et al. 2010; King and Samii 2014; Avdeenko and Gilligan
2015), even when they are designed to bring individuals of different social groups
together (Brück and Ferguson 2020).
While it is obvious that well-designed work and training programs could bring dif-
ferent groups together in the same place, it is less clear whether such efforts will bear
fruit. On one side of this argument is a body of evidence suggesting that contact has
successfully reduced tensions between groups. Another is that when such tensions
have been the focus of the contact, it has produced undesirable side effects, such as
lowering welfare in other dimensions (Cilliers et al. 2016). In turn, workplaces and
training centers offer an opportunity to stimulate contact, without placing such con-
tact at the heart of the activities in question. Scacco and Warren (2018) show such
findings in a vocational training program inNigeria. Some participants are randomly
assigned to multi-ethnic training groups, and others to mono-ethnic ones. Those in
multi-ethnic trainings discriminate less against out-groups. However, this opens the
question as towhether such outcomes are a product of the training, of how the train-
ing was administered, or both.
Coupled with Hjørt’s (2014) finding of significant and costly discrimination in the
workplace, this suggests that there is no guarantee that multi-ethnic job programs
will improve group relationships. Furthermore, they raise a secondary question—
even if jobs programs did definitively stimulate such change, are they the optimalway
of doing so?
The Competition Theory
Competition, especially for scarce services and other resources, is a commonly cited
link between climate shocks and violence (Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; Hsiang
et al. 2013; Theisen et al. 2013; Harari and Ferrara 2018). This argument goes
that extreme weather, such as drought, leads vulnerable people to migrate. In turn,
this increases (perceived) competition for scarce resources in the places to which
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they are displaced. As well as being a potential cause of inter-group tensions, dis-
placement can also be one of their consequences, suggesting the potential for a
pernicious displacement-competition-conflict-displacement cycle (Alsharabati and
Nammour 2015).5 These ideas are also well-grounded in more general theory.
Sääksvuori et al. (2011) and Abbink et al. (2010) show that both discrimination
against out-groups and willingness to punish them increase in more competitive
scenarios.
It can be argued that generating employment is an efficient way of reducing per-
ceptions of competition and of combating such adverse social norms. Individuals in
employment tend to report higher well-being and better perceptions of the future
than those who are unemployed (Korpi 1997; Dolan et al. 2008; Rainer and Siedler
2008). Similarly, better access to scarce services or employment seems likely to lessen
perceptions of competition, which in turn should lower competition-based biases.
What Is the Evidence that Employment Programs Reduce
Violence?
Three takeaways are clear from section 2. First, economic first principles provide solid
grounds to believe that employment programs might contribute to peacebuilding.
These theories equally apply to the programs themselves (i.e., regardless of whether
the program builds employment, the existence of that program could contribute to
peace) as to their employment impact. Second, the causal chains are often long. At
times, robust empirical information on some of the links in these chains is missing
or thin. In turn, theory alone is insufficient to say with certainty that employment
programs contribute to peacebuilding. Third, the first two takeaways imply a need to
directlymodel the impact of employment programs on outcomes related to peace and
stability.
This section reviews academic and grey literature, focusing on employment pro-
grams taking place at the individual level, in order to establish this baseline learning.
That is, the purpose is not to understand the impact of seismic regulatory change,
nor to study large government transfers. For example, while Dasgupta et al. (2017)
and Fetzer (2014) show a reduction in violence in India through a guaranteed-
work program, the program is available to all individuals in a given region. Ferguson
et al. (2019) show that some indicators improve, while others worsen, when con-
sidering the regional impact of multiple large employment programs on stability. In
both cases, scale makes it is difficult to know if outcomes are driven by micro-level
behavior, or preferences changes, or by more aggregate shifts in the political econ-
omy. Reductions in violence through such shifts have also been stimulated by large
government transfers (Berman et al. (2011) and aid stimulus (Azam and Thelen
2008; Nielsen et al. 2011; Young and Findlay 2011; Böhnke and Zürcher 2013;








bro/lkaa004/5916415 by guest on 09 D
ecem
ber 2020
Gutting and Steinwand 2017). Rather, this review seeks to establish understanding
on the impact of employment as a stimulus for the individual, and thus on cases
where the program, and its implications for employment, are isolated as the catalyst
for change.
In order to capture the widest base of grey and academic literature, the following
process was undertaken: (a) keyword searches on Google Scholar with publications
assessed against relevance and quality criteria; (b) analysis of the reference lists of
each relevant study, aswell as all studies citing the article in question,with all articles
again assessed against relevance criteria.
The study adopts three relevance criteria. The first pertains to the quality of the
evaluation.While attention isnot restrictedonly to randomized studies, it does impose
that studies must be of a credible quantitative design, including treatment and refer-
ence groups studied before and after program roll out and where biases in the rollout
are credibly dealtwith. Second, the focus is restricted to programswhere boosting em-
ployment and employment indicators is, demonstrably, an aim of the program.6 This
has the effect of excluding, for example, large-scale infrastructure programs, while
temporarily creating jobs donot, deliberately, intend to do so. Similarly, someprogram
typologies—for example, cash transfers—are included, thatmight not, standardly, be
thought of as coming under the umbrella definition of a “job program”, so long as it
has a direct employment motivation.
Third, this study focuses on studies that make credible claims to measure peace
or stability as an outcome but excludes studies that look at outcomes part of the
way along the causal chain. This has the effect of excluding some high-quality work
that partially bridges the gap. For example, Adoho et al. (2014) show—along with
significant increases in economic well-being—positive impacts of an employment
and training program on women’s empowerment. Scacco and Warren (2018) show
thatmixed-ethnicity training groups canmitigate discrimination against out-groups.
While these studies establish that employment programs generate positive externali-
ties, this is insufficient as one cannot be certain about the links between these inter-
mediate outcomes and peace or stability. Put another way, just as there is no guar-
antee that an employment program contributes to peace because it has a positive
employment outcome, there is also no guarantee that programs that generate other
positive externalities do so. Other studies, although ostensibly economic (e.g., Heller
et al. 2017), show impressive social stability outcomes but do not explicitly contain a
job-based input.
Based on a review conducted with these parameters, only four studies turn out to
be both relevant and of sufficient quality:7
1. Blattman et al. (2014) use a randomized design to study the Youth Opportunity
Program,whichattempts tohelp theunemployed transition into self-employment,
as well as promoting stability in the highly violent context of Northern Uganda.
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Based ona cashgrant of, on average, just under$400per participant, the program
shows “impressively large” economic impacts. Four years after the program was
rolled out, it is shown that beneficiaries invested in skills, training, tools andmate-
rials, seldom “waste” the grant (e.g., on tobacco, alcohol or drugs), are more than
twice as likely to practice a “skilled trade”, and have 57% greater capital stocks,
38% higher earnings, and 17% higher hours worked. These impressive economic
gains, however, are notmatched by positive outcomes in terms of stability. Individ-
uals in the treatment group do not show comparable shifts in terms of integration
into their communities, engagement in collective action, engagement in antisocial
behavior, or in terms of support of the government.
2. Mercy Corps (2015) uses a quasi-experiment to study the Introducing New Voca-
tional Education and Skills Training (INVEST) program in Northern Afghanistan
by comparing the outcomes of program graduates to a new intake. The study also
shows strong economic impacts, with graduates 36 percentage points more likely
to be employed than the reference group.8 Programparticipation is also associated
with a12.7percentage point increase in income in the previous fourweeks, higher
economic optimism, and greater business connections and inter-tribal economic
activity. However, peace- and stability-related outcomes are reported as “incon-
clusive”. Self-reported willingness to engage in political violence decreased for the
treatment group, but willingness to use violence against an unfair government
decision increased. No effects were found on beliefs governing whether the use of
political violence is justified, or on support for the Taliban.
3. Blattman et al. (2017) use a randomized design in order to study the impact of
two treatments—eight weeks of cognitive behavioral therapy, and a $200 un-
conditional cash grant—on young men engaged in criminal behaviors in Liberia.
The program had two aims: boosting economic outcomes and reducing antisocial
behaviors. In the short term, there is a range of significant improvements from
the cash-only and therapy treatments, but these effects approached zero in the
medium term. Similar effects are shown on estimated income, consumption, and
ownership of durable assets. When provided by itself, cash did not lead to any sig-
nificant reductions in antisocial behaviors. In the short term, the therapy by it-
self did reduce engagement across the full index of antisocial behaviors, but these
reductions were sustained after a year only when therapy and cash were given
together.
4. Lyall et al. (2020) use a randomized design in order to evaluate the impact of
Mercy Corps’ INVEST program and an associated cash grant of $75. Economi-
cally, this study tests impacts on employment, recent economic activity, and cash
earned and days worked in the previous month. By the end of the study period,
those who took part in the TVET training were 43 percentage points more likely
to report having engaged in economic activity, worked 1.13 days more and were
5.3 percentage points more likely to have earned cash. By contrast, recipients of
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the cash transfer, and (oddly) of both treatment arms showed no economic bene-
fits. Impacts on support of militants were also mixed. Vocational training had no
effect. Recipients of the cash transfer report increased support for the government
during the first follow-up,with support for theTaliban reduced by12.8 percentage
points and willingness to undertake pro-Taliban activities diminished by 9.6 per-
centage points. However, by a second follow-up, an apparent “backlash” is shown,
with support for the government declining for those who received the cash trans-
fer. Similar results are shown for those who receive both treatment arms.
Two takeaways from this review are obvious. The first is that all four articles make
the argument that employment programs can boost labor market outcomes and in-
come in violent and complicated environments. To some degree or another, all four
show improvements in their participants’ outcomes, even if this cannot be sustained
in the long run. Second, however, this does not hold when considering stability-
related outcomes. In general, there are few sustained positive impacts of programs
on stability, even in the face of economic gains.
Drawing conclusions on the link between employment and peace is not possible
from these findings; however, we argue that these findings are also insufficient to de-
bunk the relationship. Specifically, studies to date suffer at least two key limitations
that prevent drawing such firm conclusions.
First, while all four programs take place in violent countries, it is not clear if they
necessarily focused on key fracture lines. It is not often clear which theory of change
is likely to be at play in a given location, and in turn, it is impossible to ascertain if the
design of the program chimes with that. For example, in situations where societal
fractures are driven by a lack of contact and adverse interpersonal norms, it is un-
clear whether a cash transfer—even one specifically designed and targeted to boost
employment—should perform.
Second, it is a priori unclear why employment programs should impact on the par-
ticular outcome variables chosen for analysis, even if those outcomes link to peace
or stability. This is particularly important when thinking about the “unit of the inter-
vention”, which is at the individual level in the programs in this review. It is unclear
that positive impacts should be expected on indicators that relate more to wider so-
cial or cultural norms. A training program that raises an individual’s level of income
without having similar impacts on that person’s personal network, for example, is
unlikely to shift perceptions surrounding government performance or inequality.
In turn, while it is easy to be pessimistic, these conclusions suggest a need for
more systematic learning on the key relationships at play. First, this requires draw-
ing meaningful links between the situation in which a program will take place, the
design of the program, the expectations that can be formed of that program, and
the outcome indicators that are to be used. Second, it requires applying meaningful
theories of change that link the program to those fractures and outcomes. Third, it
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requires systematic learning, based on analyzing multiple programs, in multiple lo-
cations, against a set of transparent indicators.9
What Can Be Learned from Employment for Peace Programs that
Have Taken Place?
In this spirit, this section conducts a systematic review of employment for peace pro-
grams. This analysis is based on data pulled from all programs definable as “employ-
ment for peace” from the databases of four large international organizations (In-
ternational Labor Organisation (ILO), Peacebuilding Support Offiice (PBSO), United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank) between 2005 and
2015.
First, a keyword search of each organization’s program database is conducted.
For all non-Francophone countries, the keywords empl*, job*, work*, and skill*
were used. For Francophone countries, trava* and competence* were additionally
included. This produced a list of 2,415 programs that took place in countries that
have appeared on the World Bank’s list of fragile scenarios at least once since 2005.
As the theories of change specified in section 2 do not require non-employment
inputs to function, an intervention that is definable as an employment program and
that takes place in a fragile or conflict-affected state qualifies it for definition as an
“employment for peace” program. All multi-agency programs are reviewed to ensure
that duplicates are not included.
To fit with this study’s definitions, the list was further restricted to those that pro-
vided at least one of the following services: (a) salaried work, either directly (e.g.,
through cash-for-work schemes) or by facilitating connections between participants
and employers; (b) vocational training programs and/or entrepreneurial skills train-
ing; and (c) interventions in support of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises
(MSMEs). Relevant programs were reviewed to analyze various clusters of key vari-
ables: (a) program duration; (b) target groups; (c) intervention type; (d) focus(es) of
the programs; and (e) availability of program documents. This generated a “longlist”
of 432 programs.
A shortlist of programs for in-depth analysis was then generated. Programs were
selected for further analysis only if a final report, internal evaluation, or external eval-
uation were available. Programs where employment was not a primary (or joint pri-
mary) focus were also excluded, leaving 69 programs. From these, a shortlist of 33
was defined based on explicit peacebuilding or social stability goals. On this basis, pri-
ors suggest an expectation that these programs should have been analyzed against
peace-related outcomes. The process to arrive at these 33 programs is shown in
figure 1. The short-listed programs are analyzed in-depth to identify: (a) if the pro-
gram has a definable theory of change running from employment stimulation to
peace; (b) if an evaluation focusing specifically on peacebuilding and social stability
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Figure 1. Selection Process for the Systemetic Review
Source:Authors’ own construction.
Note: In Step 1, between 2005 and 2015, 2,415 jobs for peace programs are identified by keyword searches of ILO,
PBSO, UNDP andWorld Bank program databases. In each subsequent step, a series of further restrictions are applied
to the long-list, in order to derive the most relevant programs.
outcomeshas takenplace; (c) if so,whichpeacebuilding and social stability indicators
have been analyzed and why they have been chosen.
Nineteen programs on the shortlist describe employment as the exclusive primary
objective, with peacebuilding an auxiliary objective; the remaining 14 list employ-
ment and peacebuilding as joint primary aims. This variation is used to reflect on
whether there are design differences between “employment-only” and “employment-
peacebuilding” targeted interventions.
The remainder of this section is split into four subsections: the first discussing
the design of the interventions; the second discussing the employment impacts of
the programs; the third reflecting on the peacebuilding impacts; and the fourth the
application of the theories of change.
Designing Employment Programs and Employment for Peace Programs
There is no evidence that design differs between the employment-only and
employment-peacebuilding programs. In both cases, a variety of approaches are
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used to generate employment. Supply-side approaches seek to improve employability,
especially through vocational training, while demand-side approaches attempt to
increase the number of job opportunities through private sector partnerships,
entrepreneurship support, etc.
Most of the programs reviewed contain a vocational training component (22 out
of 33) but only four exclusively use this approach. The others include training along
with labor-based interventions, support toMSMEs, or both. Similarly,most (24 out of
33) include a labor-based component that aims to directly create jobs, with (17 out
of 24) heavily relying on short-term labor-intensive approaches. 15 interventions in-
clude entrepreneurial support. There are no major differences in structure between
the programs that elevate peacebuilding to a keymotive and those that do not. In this
regard, most employment for peace programs are not designed to specifically interact
with the societal fractures that necessitate the program. Rather, standard employ-
ment programs are deployed in these complex environments.
The Employment Impacts of Employment for Peace Programming
In almost all cases, program-levelmonitoring and evaluation focuses only on narrow
and short-term programaims. Themost frequently used indicators are as follows: the
number of people employed (19 out of 33); the number of people trained (16 out of
33); the number of workdays generated (12 out of 33); and the number of MSMEs re-
ceiving from support (six out of 33).Wider indicators, like increased income (3 out of
33), are includedmuchmore rarely. In almost all cases evaluation is done at the level
of outputs. For example, while 25 out of 33 programs claim to have had positive im-
pacts, in all but two cases (Mukkavilli 2008; Kavanagh 2012), such assessments are
made without reference to a control group. When evidence is available, employment
for peace programs appear to have positive employment impacts. However, given the
small number of studies that have been conducted, this should not be taken to be
reflective of the complete record.
Peacebuilding Impacts of Employment for Peace Programming
Since programs that place peacebuilding on an equal footing with employment do
not differ in design from those that do not, it is not a priori obvious how or why these
programs have a peacebuilding focus. In almost all cases, generating employment is
presented as the only evidence that a program will build peace. The “Appui à la for-
mation par l’apprentissage et à l’insertion des jeunes déscolarisés et désœuvrés des régions
affectées par les conflits, comme facteur de consolidation de la paix” program in the Cen-
tral AfricanRepublic, for example, states that it aims “[t]o effectively contribute to the
changeof conditions for youth, byoffering them thepossibility to access employment,
to create better life conditions for themselves and to become agents of peacebuilding.”
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(UNDP2009). Further, the “Jobs for Peace –12,500Youth Employed andEmpowered
through an Integrated Approach” program inNepal states that it will, “. . .contribute
to the achievement of sustainable development and peace consolidation [. . .] by cre-
ating opportunities for decent and productive work for [. . .] youngmen and women”
(UNPFN 2009).
In other cases, programs are assumed to build peace through the targeting of
specific subsets of the population who are viewed as being “at risk”. In this regard,
employment-peacebuilding programs aremore likely to target youth than those with
a primary employment-only focus. For example, the “Youth Employment Support
(YES)” program in Sierra Leone states, “The lack of productive employment for youth
[is] considered not only an economic problem, but also a major political and secu-
rity risk,” (World Bank 2015). However, given the debate, especially surrounding so-
called “youth bulges”, it is not clear that the “devilmakeswork for idle hands”, or that
“incapacitation” can be assumed.10
In almost all cases, peacebuilding turns out not to be a focus of the evaluations
conducted. Indeed, some go so far as to offer a disclaimer about not being in a position
to assess the peacebuilding impacts of the program. The “Employment Creation and
Peace Building Base on Local Economic Development (EmPLED)” program in Nepal,
for example, states, “[the] question towhat extent an impact on peace building can be
demonstrated or expected [. . .] has not been assessed by the project and of course the
[Evaluation Team]was not in a position to do so itself,” (ILO 2010). Despite this, eight
internal and five external evaluations present claims of positive peacebuilding im-
pacts. These claims are typically phrased in extremely generic terms, however, mak-
ing it difficult to discern if such findings have an analytical foundation.11
The “Work for Peace- Serbisu ba Dame” program in Timor-Leste, for example,
states, “As far as the impact of the project on conflict reduction is concerned, it is fair
to conclude that the project managed to contribute to political stability and a peace-
ful environment to the extent possible,” (Koekebakker 2007). Further, the “Jobs for
Peace - 12,500 Youth Employed and Empowered through an Integrated Approach”
inNepal claims that “Many specific exampleswere reported forways inwhich the pro-
gram activities had contributed to peace. [. . .] wage employment created by the pro-
gram during the construction of roads, irrigation canals, vegetable collection centers
and marketing shed engaged the youths on constructive activities,” (Kumar-Range,
and Acharya 2011).
Evaluations have noted the limited scale of interventions vis-à-vis the magnitude
of the problem—making it unrealistic to expect a significant impact. For example, the
“Empowerment of youth at risk through job creation program in areas of tensions”
program in Lebanon states that “[i]t is difficult to determine the stabilization impact
of this project, as this project is small in scale relative to the size of the problem it is
seeking to address,” (Moran 2013). Similarly, the “Appui à la pérennisation de la paix
par la promotion de l’emploi des jeunes et des femmes aux Comores (APROJEC)” in
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Comoros states that “The project will make a modest contribution on employment
creation for youth and women and therefore its impact on peacebuilding in the con-
text of Comoros will be very limited,” (Larrabure and Ouledi 2011).
Inpractical terms, the evidence that employmentprogramsbuild peace, or are even
expected to perform in this domain, is weak. Often, peacebuilding outcomes are not
even made in program evaluations and reports; and, when they are, it is simply as-
sumed as a product of employment, which section 2 shows to be insufficient.
The Presence of Theories of Change in Employment for Peace Programming
The lack of clarity on how the impact of employment on peacebuilding is supposed
to work (in other words, the absence of a theory of change) is obvious throughout
project documents. Even when claims of impact are made, the theory of change is
unclear, as are the outcome indicators upon which such conclusions are predicated.
For example, the “Promotion du rôle des petites et micro-entreprises dans la consolidation
de la paix” in Burundi evaluation states that “The link between the small enterprise
project and peacebuildingwas always unclear,” (Campbell et al. 2014). In turn, even
when claims of impact aremade, the theory of change uponwhich such conclusions
are predicated is unclear. There are, in fact, only three examples where a theory of
change can be defined from the program documents. The learning that has taken
place from each is discussed below.
Program Example: Guinea-Bissau
The theory of change of the program “Labor-intensive employment for youth and
women in the lead-up to and immediate post-electoral period in Guinea-Bissau” can
be linked to grievances, and stresses the importance of providing “peace dividends”
to “at-risk groups”, such as youth and women, thus enhancing their confidence in
the state. The program document particularly stresses the importance of setting off a
catalytic effect to “show” the results of the program beyond immediate beneficiaries,
thus signaling peace dividends to the broader population. There was no evaluation
available for this program. The final report does not address the issue as to whether
the intervention succeeded in having this “demonstrative” catalytic effect.
Program Example: Lebanon
The theory of change elaborated in the “Empowerment of youth at risk through
job creation program in areas of tensions” program is threefold. It is linked to (a)
opportunity, providing young people with ways of generating income as an alter-
native to joining an armed group, (b) contact, reinforcing positive interactions and
creating common ground between the Palestinian and Lebanese communities, and
(c) competition, by easing competition over access to jobs for both displaced and
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host communities. With regard to the opportunity and competition, a mid-term
evaluation found beneficiaries, in all likelihood, were not those whoweremost at risk
of recruitment. “The majority of the participant beneficiaries in the activities in this
project are probably unlikely to be those who aremost likely to be the first to take part
in violence [. . .] This project does not appear to actively identify and recruit these
individuals,” (Moran 2013).
An evaluation does find an indirect impact on the community at large, which was
not included in the original design: “. . . this project does have the effect of offering
hope to the community at large that there continues to be initiatives aimed at im-
proving their situation, that they have not been forgotten and there is a chance that
at least one familymember could improve their life chances,” (Moran2013) In practi-
cal terms, the evaluationhints at a possible “multiplier” effect that—byhappenstance
rather than by design—might reach those at risk.
No evidence is found for the contact theory. In fact, little interaction between the
Lebanese and Palestinian communities took place: “The activities supported under
this activity provided for little direct interaction or integration with local Lebanese
people, apart from those participating in Apprenticeships,” (Moran 2013). Further-
more, both evaluations suggest that, rather than a lack of interaction, the crucial
problemwas the disadvantaged position of Palestinian job-seekers vis-à-vis Lebanese
employers, suggesting the program might not have addressed the source of tension:
“The Jobseekerswho attended the focus group identified that one of themain reasons
for engaging with [the program] is the perception that [. . .] they would be somewhat
better protected against exploitation by Lebanese employers. . . The reality that some
Lebanese employers appear to be exploiting Palestinians is clearly a source of tension
between the two communities which should be addressed in order to promote PBF
objectives,” (Moran 2013).
Program Example: Nepal
The “Jobs for Peace” (J4P) program was primarily underpinned by an opportunity-
based theory of change, according towhicha lack of cash inhandmadeyoungpeople
vulnerable to manipulation by vested interest groups. The program also aimed to en-
courage the peaceful gathering of young people through business development and
youth-led programs for youth empowerment (contact). There was a program self-
evaluation and independent final evaluation.
The program self-evaluation claims to confirm the validity of the program design
and the relevance of opportunity and stresses the link between unemployment,
idleness and violence: “The project is relevant to the target groups in the target dis-
tricts because of high levels of youth un/underemployment with the inherent risk of
idle and poor youth engaging in criminal activities thereby undermining the fragile
Nepali peace process. There is a clear rationale and justification for the project [. . .]
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Idle youth are easy prey for recruitment by armed criminal groups across the Tarai,”
(McCarthy 2010). An independent final evaluation states: “Wage employment cre-
ated by the program. . . engaged the youths on constructive activities,” (Kumar-Range
and Acharia 2011). The concept of employment as an antidote to idleness is again
stressed: “Community members and youth reported that a new and positive self-
image for youthwas created, transforming them from idle vagrants into contributing
community members,” (Kumar-Range and Acharia 2011).
In this regard, the conclusion is not only that peacebuilding outcomes of employ-
ment programs are very seldom, if ever, meaningfully analyzed, but also that there is
very scant information on how these programs are designed to deliver those outputs.
There are only a small number of cases where meaningful theories of change can
be traced through the program’s design phase; and, even when they are included, it
is not immediately clear what the program has done in order to deliver impacts via
through these routes.
Conclusions
Significant resources have been spent on the assumption that employment programs
contribute to peace, despite a lack of major critical reflection on the strength and lim-
itations of this potential relationship. Do employment programs really contribute to
peacebuilding? And if so, how?
Based on in-depth reviews of academic literature, grey literature, and program
documents, this article establishes threemain insights into the links between jobs pro-
grams and peace-related outcomes. First, economic first principles suggest that there
are strong theoretical reasons to expect that employment programs can strengthen
themicro-foundations of peace and stability. Yet, the causal chains of impact specified
by these theories are often long and containmultiple links, some of which lack consis-
tent empirical confirmation or are otherwiseweak. Second, the existing evidence base
formanyof these purported links is, in practice, thin, and program-specific chains are
usually notmodelled in practice. Third, headline program impacts on social outcomes
at the micro-level have typically been assumed rather than tested. Existing evidence
is based on a handful of case studies of programs, which themselves are—mostly—
inconclusive and provide, at best, only weak evidence.
This does not mean that jobs programs do not, or cannot, contribute to peace. In-
stead, these results show that the likely impacts of large and costly programs have not
been tested in a rigorous or systematic way. In turn, there are no stylized facts about
how best to maximize the peacebuilding impacts of jobs programs, or on the types of
jobs programs best-placed to deliver these impacts, or the settings to which different
program typologies are best-suited.
This knowledge gap clearly identifies an urgent need to generate systematic learn-
ing about the expectations andactual contribution of employment programs to peace
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and stability. It is particularly important to spell out how and why a program might
have an impact before it is implemented. Furthermore, it is important to define the
specific peacebuilding domains where the program is expected to have an impact
and the associated indicators it should impact upon. Following this, it is necessary
to rigorously test program channels and impacts empirically, and to establish which
lessons can be generalized. This process should be done in multiple ways, ranging
from research-based methods to intra- and inter-agency learning and in-depth con-
text analysis, all of which are shown to be largely absent. If investment in jobs-for-
peace programs is to continue at current levels, such learning is urgently required.
Specifically, the study recommends the generation of further evidence and learn-
ing on themicrofoundations of instability, such as distinguishing between instigators
of collective violence and their followers. Thiswill allowmore detailed understanding
of what motivates individuals to engage in behaviors that threaten peace and stabil-
ity, and, in turn, lead to a better understanding of what can deter these behaviors.
International organizations have an important role to play in stimulating this learn-
ing, not least because it should lead to improvements in program design. The theories
of change that are confirmed by, or that are developed from, this research should be
mainstreamed in all program documents and planning. This process should begin
with a strong definition of the outcome aims of the program, how the program tar-
gets these outcomes, and which indicators accurately capture those outcomes.
For programs aiming to build jobs and peace, there is also a need to ensure that an
employment program interacts meaningfully with the fault lines that are expected
to cause conflict and tensions in the targeted region. If tensions, for instance, re-
late to a lack of contact between societal groups, a cash-transfer program might be
poorly placed to stimulate the inter-group interactions that are needed. For some pro-
grams, therefore, it might be more realistic to scale back untested ambitions and, in-
stead, to focus ondelivering justahigh-quality employment intervention.Conducting
jobs programs in conflict-affected and fragile areas is a challenging task already, even
without trying to build peace at the same time. In turn, at least in some cases it might
be “better to use. . . funds on consolidating a functional and demand driven” program
(Larrabure and Ouledi 2011). This is not to say that contributing to peace through
jobs programs is beyond reach. However, to paraphrase Jan Tinbergen, achieving two
goalswitha single instrument is complexand requiresmulti-disciplinary skills and in-
stitutional learning that, so far, havenot beenpresent in efforts to build peace through
jobs and employment programming.
Notes
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1. This figure is based on the researchers’ own estimate from budgets and expenditures extracted
from this program review (see section 4) and is, very likely, a large underestimate of true expenditure.
First, this study only covers programs implemented by UNDP, ILO or the World Bank and/or funded
through the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Second, even within these restrictions, budget information
is sometimes incomplete or missing.
2. There are two conceivable routes through which employment programs could deliver these ef-
fects. The first is through the program effect, that is, the simple presence of a program can contribute
to peace and stability, regardless of the outcome of that program. The second is the employment effect,
which suggests that peace and stability are promoted through the impacts of the program on employ-
ment. In other words, to build peace through the employment effect, an employment programmust first
have a definable impact on employment. Both notions are compatible with the theories discussed in this
section.
3. This is not to suggest that employment and employment programs cannot have demand-side im-
pacts. For example, an implication of Fearon and Laitin (2003) is that more employment widens the tax
base, which can in turn facilitate positive interactions between governments and the populace. However,
such theories rely on aggregate-level changes that are likely beyond the scope of any cluster of employ-
ment programs of the standard scale included in this research. In turn, while this discussion favors the
supply side, it does so as a result of the external constraints imposed by the focus on employment pro-
grams, rather than by more deliberate design.
4. Amore general strand of recent literature (Piketty 2013; Rodrik 2017;Alvaredo et al. 2018)may
dispute this, by drawing connecting lines between increasing inequalities in the last four decades and
ongoing political changes and challenges around theworld. However, whether such political challenges
extend to violent conflict is not clear.
5. In some ways, there appears to be overlap between the “competition” and “grievance” theories.
However, grievances (at least constructed as has been done here) are argued to rely on group-based
tensions, that is, one group does not have (or perceives it does not have) something that another group
does, and that this distribution is unfair. The “competition” theory does not, strictly, rely on either group-
based fault lines, nor perceptions of “fairness” in the same sense. Therefore,while this theory could come
underwider definitions of grievance, this study considers it useful to delineate themas done here, noting
that none of these theories necessarily exist in a silo and that there are strong logical overlaps between
them.
6. An extension of this logic is that a peacebuilding program is considered as any program that states
building peace as (one of its) aim(s). In this sense, employment for peace programs are, fully, a subset of
peacebuilding programs. In turn, in this case, peacebuilding programs are not defined, explicitly, by a
specific set of inputs or design features, but rather in their outcome aims.
7. In addition, the authors are aware of further projects that likely have relevance for this review
but are excluded as due to their early presentation of results at the time of writing. Kimou et al. (2018)
conduct anRCT of a cash-for-work program in Cote d’Ivoire and showmixed results in attitudes towards
peace. Individuals trained on how to seek employment show improved attitudes; those who receive en-
trepreneurial support showworsened attitudes. Rink and Carlson (2019), on the other hand, show that
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beneficiaries of an employment program in Zimbabwe are actually more likely to voice dissent and en-
gage in disobedience.
8. The true scale of this finding is, perhaps, open to debate, as a requirement for entry into the pro-
gram is that a participant is unemployed at the time the training begins. In turn, the reference group,
likely, have abnormally low levels of employment vis-à-vis the population as a whole. However, the pur-
pose of this article is not to reflect onmethodological imperfections, per se, and it therefore does not seek
to openly dispute these findings.
9. As literature on the micro-level analysis of violent conflict and humanitarian emergencies has
shown,muchmore robust empirical analysis is possible than is often assumed by practitioners and other
experts. In this sense, this study holds that it is entirely possible, if not without challenge, to conduct
methodologically sound empirical analyses in conflict-affected places. (See: Puri et al. 2017; Brück et al.
2019; Brück and d’Errico 2019; Verwimp et al. 2019).
10. Only six programs out of the 33-program shortlist, and out of the 14 that place peacebuilding
alongside employment as amain outcome of interest, include program aspects, outside of employment,
that are designed to build peace. These activities fall into two key categories: those aimed at increasing
awareness and understanding on conflict resolution at the individual level; and those that aim to bring
people together in order to boost intra- and inter-group trust. This study is not explicitly interested in the
outcomes of these additional treatment arms. Rather, it only considers the outcomes of the employment
arms in order to minimize the risk of showing peacebuilding impacts from peacebuilding, rather than
employment, programming.
11. These programs are, respectively: “Projet de consolidation de la paix dans les zones minières ar-
tisanales de la province duNord Kivu (project Rubaya)“ (DRC); “Projet d’appui a l’insertion économique
des jeunes et des femmes” and “Programme nationale d’emploi specifique pour les jeunes (filles et gar-
cons) a risque de conflit” (both Guinea); “Recovery through Employment Generation, Environmental
Rehabilitation and Disaster Mitigation” in Haiti; “Emergency Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation
Project” in Iraq; “Employment Creation and Peace Building based on Local Economic Development (Em-
PLED)” and “Jobs for Peace - 12,500Youth Employed and Empowered through an IntegratedApproach”
(bothNepal); and “Joint Programme: Creating Opportunities for Youth Employment in Sudan” (Sudan),
for the internal evaluations. For the external evaluations: “Empowerment of youth at risk through job
creation program inareas of tensions” (Lebanon); “Jobs for Peace - 12,500YouthEmployed andEmpow-
ered through an Integrated Approach” (Nepal); “Projet d’Appui à la Réinsertion Economique Durable
des Démobilisés en République Démocratique du Congo (ARED II)” and “Projet de consolidation de la
paix dans les zones minières artisanales de la province du Nord Kivu (project Rubaya)” (DRC); and
“Recovery through Employment Generation, Environmental Rehabilitation and Disaster Mitigation”
(Haiti).
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